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Abstract. In this paper, I attempt to clarify the heart of Dewey’s philosophy:
his method (denotative method (DM) / pattern of inquiry (PI)). Despite the
traditional understanding of Dewey as anti-foundationalist, I want to show
that Dewey did have metaphysical foundations for his method: the principle of
continuity or theory of emergentism. I also argue that Dewey’s metaphysical
position is better named as ‘cultural emergentism’, rather than his own term
‘cultural naturalism’. What Dewey called ‘common sense’ in his Logic, Husserl
termed as the ‘life-world’ in his Crisis. I compare two perspectives of dealing
with the phenomenon and conclude that for Dewey, the difference between
natural sciences and the common sense inquiry is that of subject-matter but
not of method. Thus, the goal is to find the unified method to be applied in
both domains. Whereas Husserl was more pessimistic: for him, the difference
was not only in subject-matter, but in the very methods. Following that dis-
cussion, I also attempt to reformulate the hard problem of consciousness
in Deweyan terms. In the end, I compare Dewey’s DM / PI with Popper’s
understandings of scientific method and conclude that there is no significant
difference between the two and that Dewey’s method could also be looked at
as hypothetic-deductive method, with the only difference in emphases.
Keywords: instrumentalist / experimental logic, denotative method, pattern
of inquiry, principle of continuity, emergentism, experience, problematic
situation, common sense, life-world, hard problem of consciousness, fact,
hypothesis, Dewey, Husserl, Popper.
Анотацiя. У цiй роботi я намагаюся прояснити сутнiсть фiлософiї Дьюї:
його метод (денотативний метод (ДМ) / структуру дослiдження (СД)).
Незважаючи на традицiйне розумiння Дьюї як анти-фундаменталiста, я
хочу показати, що, насправдi, його метод мав метафiзичнi основи: принцип
тяглостi або теорiю емерджентизму. Я також обґрунтовую, що ме-
тафiзичну позицiю Дьюї краще називати «культурним емерджентизмом»,
анiж його термiном «культурний натуралiзм». Те, що Дьюї називав «здо-
ровим глуздом» у своїй «Логiцi», Гуссерль позначав термiном «життєвий
Актуальнi проблеми духовностi:
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свiт» у «Кризi». Я порiвнюю два погляди на розумiння цього явища i ро-
блю висновок, що для Дьюї рiзниця мiж природничими науками та здоро-
вим глуздом полягає у предметi, а не в методi. Отже, мета полягає у тому,
щоб знайти унiфiкований метод, який застосовуватиметься в обох сфе-
рах. Тодi як Гуссерль був бiльш песимiстичним: для нього рiзниця поляга-
ла не тiльки в предметi, а й у самих методах. Услiд за цим обговоренням,
я також зробив спробу переформулювати важку проблему свiдомостi у
термiнах Дьюї. Насамкiнець, я порiвнюю ДМ / СД Дьюї з попперiвським
розумiнням наукового методу i роблю висновок, що мiж ними немає зна-
чної рiзницi, i що метод Дьюї також можна розглядати як гiпотетико-
дедуктивний, з єдиною рiзницею в акцентах.
Ключовi слова: iнструменталiстська / експериментальна логiка, денота-
тивний метод, структура дослiдження, принцип тяглостi, емерджентизм,
досвiд, проблемна ситуацiя, здоровий глузд, життєвий свiт, важка пробле-
ма свiдомостi, факт, гiпотеза, Дьюї, Гуссерль, Поппер.
The position which I take, namely, that all knowledge,
or warranted assertion, depends upon inquiry and that
inquiry is, truistically, connected with what is questi-
onable (and questioned) involves a skeptical element,
or what Peirce called ‘fallibilism’. But it also provi-
des for probability, and for determination of degrees
of probability in rejecting all intrinsically dogmatic
statements, where ‘dogmatic’ applies to any statement
asserted to possess inherent self-evident truth. That
the only alternative to ascribing to some propositions
self-sufficient, self-possessed, and self-evident truth is
a theory which finds the test and mark of truth in
consequences of some sort is, I hope, an acceptable view.
At all events, it is a position to be kept in mind in assessi-
ng my views [9, p. 203].
1. Introduction
What is the heart of Dewey’s philosophy? It is hard even to try to
answer such a question given such a prolific author as Dewey. Nevertheless,
one can argue that it is his aesthetics, metaphysics, his theory of educa-
tion, ethics etc., because Dewey seemed to apply his central philosophical
insights in every major area of philosophical research.
Here, I want to look at Dewey as a philosopher of science in the first
place. In my view, the quintessence of Dewey’s philosophy is his philosophic
method. Because namely his method as applied in the philosophic areas as
above-mentioned exemplified Dewey’s original voice as a philosopher —
Dewey as he is known today.
It’s not hard to see that Dewey’s method of any kind of investigation
or inquiry should be understood as the ‘pattern of inquiry’ (PI), as well
Andrii Leonov 5
as the ‘denotative method’ (DM). The former was well exemplified in his
monumental Logic (1938) [8], whereas the latter is to be discovered in
his metaphysical magnum opus Experience and Nature (1925) [7]. But,
generally speaking, the very pattern or the ‘essence’ of the method can be
found in every Dewey’s work, which shows his experimental logic. Namely,
the method of inquiry exemplifies the structure of experience as such. And
no one could have possibly denied that the notion of experience is one of
the key concepts (if not the most important one) in Dewey’s philosophy.
I also believe that Dewey’s DM / PI is how Dewey himself understood
the method of natural sciences. The latter he took as an example of the
successful inquiry, essentially experimental, and always subject to change
and thus, to progress. In his Reconstruction of Philosophy [6], Dewey was
explicit that philosophy should be oriented toward the natural sciences,
while in his Logic he explained that this should be just an orientation
and in no way a reduction. Therefore, Dewey was against the reduction of
philosophy to the natural sciences, but the success of natural sciences made
him interested in the natural scientific method and a strong proponent of
the implementation of that method into philosophic inquiry. That allows
Dewey to identify his position as naturalism, but not as physicalism or
materialism1. The latter seems to be impossible since Dewey was against
any metaphysical standpoint as a beginning of inquiry. But nevertheless, it
is more complicated than it seems prima facie. It seems that Dewey does
have a metaphysical principle as the foundation of inquiry, which he calls a
‘principle of continuity’: we are continuous as well as interdependent with
nature. To put it briefly, the latter principle exemplifies what today could
be called a theory of emergentism. According to this theory, consciousness
or mind emerge from the physical at some point, but is not reducible to
it. But here is the crucial question: what does actually emerge according
to Dewey? This is also a question to be dealt with.
Therefore, Dewey’s naturalism as well as the theory of inquiry has a
two-fold origin: one in terms of method, and the other one – as regards
to its foundations. As to the latter, this is a ‘principle of continuity’ or
emergentism. I would even argue that Dewey’s metaphysical philosophy
could be claimed as ‘cultural emergentism’ rather than ‘cultural natura-
lism’ (as it is originally put by Dewey himself) [8, p. 28].
It is interesting to mention that Dewey’s pattern of inquiry has a uni-
fying force: it is to be applied in both natural sciences as well as at the
1In his 1943 paper Anti-Naturalism in Extremis, Dewey was explicitly defending
his naturalistic position against materialistic interpretations [10].
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common sense level. Namely, common sense (as depicted in Dewey’s Logic)
is what Edmund Husserl would earlier call in his Crisis of the European
Sciences (1935) as the life-world (das Lebenswelt). But as opposed to
Husserl, and given Dewey’s naturalistic origins and inclination, his tone
was more optimistic: the pattern of inquiry is to unite both common sense
and the natural sciences, and given that the very method is to be derived
from that of the natural sciences, there is no reason to talk about a totally
different methodology to properly deal with the common sense level in
the first place. It is enough to grasp the very method of the sciences and
employ it at the common sense level as well.
But before talking about inquiry’s pattern, let’s look at Dewey’s
understanding of inquiry itself.
2. Inquiry and its metaphysical foundations:
Dewey’s philosophy of mind
Dewey seems to broadly identify logic with the theory of inquiry in
general. By the latter, he understands «controlled or directed transforma-
tion of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the
original situation into a unified whole» [8, p. 108]. Where by ‘situation’,
Dewey understands the objects and events in their connection with a
‘contextual whole’. Namely, the latter signifies situation in a Deweyan
sense [8, p. 108].
That being said, what are the metaphysical foundations of logic /
theory of inquiry? One can look at the theory of emergentism as the
metaphysical foundation in question. One has to note that Dewey didn’t
use the notion of emergentism as such, rather he constantly appealed to
the principle of continuity. But the way he used this principle and defined
its meaning definitely suggests that emergentism is the proper word to use
here.
The general definition of emergentism is as follows:
emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamen-
tal entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. (For
example, it is sometimes said that consciousness is an emergent property
of the brain.) [16].
And Dewey’s way of an appeal to continuity seems to be identical to the
former definition: stating that logic is essentially naturalistic, Dewey means
that «there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and
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biological operations and physical operations. ‘Continuity’, on the other
side, means that rational operations grow out of organic activities, without
being identical with that from which they emerge» [8, p. 26].
The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of
the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities and
forms. The idea of continuity is not self-explanatory. But its meaning
excludes complete rupture on one side and mere repetition of identities
on the other; it precludes reduction of the ‘higher’ to the ‘lower’ just as it
precludes complete breaks and gaps. The growth and development of any
living organism from seed to maturity illustrates the meaning of continuity
[8, p. 30].
On the one hand, and as it was shown before, the principle of continuity
(or emergentism) is foundational for the theory of inquiry as such. On
the other hand, Dewey is highly opposed to any logical first principles
like ‘a priori intuitional act’ and ‘Intellectus Purus’ or Pure Intuition as
foundation of logic and thus
precludes resting logic upon metaphysical and epistemological assumpti-
ons and presuppositions. The latter are to be determined, if at all, by
means of what is disclosed as the outcome of inquiry2; they are not to be
shoved under inquiry as its «foundation». On the epistemological side, it
precludes, as was noted earlier in another connection, the assumption of a
prior ready-made definition of knowledge which determines the character
of inquiry. Knowledge is to be defined in terms of inquiry, not vice-versa,
both in particular and universally [8, p. 28].
That being said, one can see a contradiction: on the one hand, Dewey
is trying to get rid of all metaphysical and epistemological assumptions
and prejudices, but actually fails to do it because of his naturalism (emer-
gentism). One can even suggest that Dewey tends to be ‘phenomenological-
ly-transcendental’, without really being as such3.
As regards Dewey’s philosophy of mind, the picture is different in that
he doesn’t seem to have any theory of ‘mind’ in general. Otherwise, in
the chapter The Pattern of Inquiry from his Logic (1938), Dewey seems
to present his behavioristic inclinations: he wants to get rid of anything
‘mentalistic’, ‘subjective’, ‘mental’ as opposed to ‘publicly observable’. We
are not mental creatures, but ‘biological-cultural human beings’ [8, p. 110].
2Italics are mine, Leonov A.
3On the other hand, one could say that though he failed in being transcendental
in terms of neutrality to all metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions, he
nevertheless succeeded in providing the essential conditions for any genuine method
of inquiry as such: his denotative method / pattern of inquiry. In this sense, he does
appear to be ‘transcendental’.
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In the earlier chapters of his Logic, instead of emergence of a mind, Dewey
talks about emergence of a ‘life-behavior’ or ‘organic-behavior’. Though,
Dewey still identifies an organism with a ‘self’4, later on in his essay
Anti-Naturalism in Extremis (1943) his radicalism goes even further: he
wants to eradicate words like «mind, subject, self, person, the individual»
as notions, which «absorbed from beliefs of an extra-natural character»
[10, p. 164]. On the other hand, Dewey accepts the Kantian formula that
«apart from each other ‘perceptions are blind and conceptions empty’»,
where instead of a «third activity, that of synthetic understanding, to
bring them together [. . . ] perceptual and conceptual materials are in a
functional correlativity with each other» [8, p. 115]. The facts should «be
taken as representative and not just pre-sented» [8, p. 118].
On and on, Dewey emphasizes the ‘life-behavior’ as opposed to any
‘mentalistic’ concepts of mind, consciousness etc.
Schematically, Dewey’s emergentism can be seen in the following way:
1) physical  2) biological
↑↓ ↑↓
4) cultural  3) life / organic-behavior
As one can see, there is nothing mental in this scheme5. From this
it follows, that Dewey’s approach to the ‘mind’ is third-person, rather
than first-person.6 And the theory of inquiry as such emerged from and is
dependent upon all of these ontological layers, without being reduced to
any of them, due to the emergentist principle of continuity.
That being said, maybe it would be better to call Dewey’s philosophy
not ‘cultural naturalism’, but ‘cultural emergentism’. That would clarify
his philosophical position much more, as well as free it from materiali-
stic interpretations. What emerges from our organic interactions with the
environment? Life or organic behavior (and not self, mind, subjectivity,
person etc.) Thus, due to this fact, his emergentism has definitely some
behavioristic inclinations. And because of his taking of the third-person
perspective and his rejection the first-person perspective in general, the
4«For Nature is an environment only as it is involved in interaction with an
organism, or self, or whatever be used. [. . . ] Except of course a purely mentalistic name
like consciousness» [8, p. 28].
5In his Experience and Nature, Dewey names his view as an «‘emergent’ theory of
mind»[7, p. 207].
6Here, Dewey is really radical: «Personally, as has just been said, I doubt the exi-
stence of anything ‘mental’ in the doctrinal sense alleged» [8, p. 43].
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physicalist interpretation of Dewey’s philosophy of mind is, unfortunately,
more than suggestive.
According to the ‘postulate of naturalistic continuity’, and since «inqui-
ry is a development out of organic environmental integration and interacti-
on» [8, p. 42] the pattern of inquiry emerged from our life-activities as well.
For Dewey, this pattern is so significant that it could be applied in both
common-sense and natural scientific levels.
A Reflection on common sense and natural sciences: Dewey’s
depiction vs Husserl’s. In his Crisis of the European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl proclaimed that basically there
are two crises:
(1) crisis between transcendental phenomenology and the natural sci-
ences (physicalism);
(2) and crisis between the natural sciences and the life-world (das
Lebenswelt).
As shown in [14], «the opposition between the natural sciences (physi-
calism) and transcendental phenomenology [...] stems from the Cartesian
metaphysics of res cogitans and res extensa (namely, from what I call the
‘conceptual ’ mind-body problem) and thus, is the ‘crisis’ within the Cartesi-
an framework, as well as of the latter» [14, p. 93].
Therefore, here I want to compare Husserl’s and Dewey’s takes on the
(2) crisis: namely the gap between the life-world and the natural sciences.
The problem. First, one has to mention that what Husserl in his
Crisis calls the life-world, Dewey, in his Logic, calls the common sense.
Both notions refer to the same day-to-day experience, which is prescientific.
In general, one wouldn’t be mistaken to say that both CS /LW7 refer to
the world of quality, when the scientific realm is that of quantity8.
Both Husserl and Dewey acknowledge that natural sciences come from
the CS / LW, as well both identify the same origin of the ‘crisis’ — as
substitution of the world of quality for the world of quantity due to our
forgetfulness [13, p. 48-50].9 But the differences arise when it comes to the
solution.
Differences in solution. Dewey claims that ‘split’ between CS and
natural sciences can be solved only by finding out the unified method /
7CS = common sense; LW = life-world.
8«The problem of the relation to the domain of common sense to that of science has
notoriously taken the form of opposition of the quantitative to the non-quantitative;
largely, but not exclusively, the quantitative» [8, p. 71].
9«Science takes its departure from common sense, but the return road into common
sense is devious and blocked by existing social conditions» [8, p. 83].
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logic / pattern of inquiry as common to both common sense (the life-
world) and the natural sciences. Thus, the gap between the two is caused
not because of the differences between the methods, but by the problems
they are dealing with. Therefore, finding out the unified method or pattern
of inquiry must serve as the only solution [8, p. 84].
Husserl, in his turn, thought that the difference is not just of the
subject-matter, but of the methods, and thus, wanted to ground the life-
world (the common sense) into phenomenology (as opposed to mathemati-
cal, but still eidetic method) to that of natural sciences.
In other words, Dewey wants to find the unified meta-language to
properly deal with both the life-world and the natural sciences, whereas
Husserl thinks that basically there are two: phenomenology and the natural
sciences, which are opposed to each other.
Common sense / Life-world (CS / LW)
↑ ↑
Method of phenomenology Method of Natural sciences
=
Two meta-languages to describe and deal with one CS / LW
Husserl’s way: to ground CS / LW into transcendental phenomenology,
because natural sciences are not adequate to properly describe and deal
with the former.
Dewey’s way: to close the gap (‘crisis’) between CS / LW and natural
sciences one has to find the general method (pattern) of natural sciences
and to employ it in CS / LW. This method will be the unified logic of both
CS / LW and that of natural sciences.
It is obvious that Dewey’s and Husserl’s ways of dealing with the ‘crisis’
are essentially opposed to each other. For Husserl, Dewey’s way would be
essentially naturalistic (naturalistic attitude), when for Dewey, Husserl’s
approach would present an appeal to some ‘occult’ intuition, with nothing
scientific about it.
It’s also true that both couldn’t avoid the metaphysical foundations of
their philosophies. In Husserl case, it is still Cartesianism (conceptually),
while Dewey’s metaphysical perspective is that of emergentism. (And it is
also clear that for Dewey a crisis between transcendental phenomenology
and natural sciences would be an absurd and the metaphysical atavism.)
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When Husserl looks at the natural sciences negatively (through their
identification with physicalism), Dewey’s outlook on them is much more
positive and progressive, because namely from the natural sciences, the
unified method should be extracted and employed into CS / LW, which
would make our dealing with this qualitative realm successful, without any
reduction to the natural sciences as such.
In general, it is interesting that both Dewey and Husserl identified
the origin of the crisis between the life-world and the natural sciences
very similarly, though Dewey seems to be more optimistic in terms of its
solution.
Remark on the hard problem of consciousness from the per-
spective of the crisis between the LW / CS and the natural
sciences. Prima facie, the hard problem of consciousness (see: [1], [2])
could be looked at more as a philosophical problem (as the heart of the
contemporary mind-body problem), than that of the sciences. But one can
look at the hard problem as genuinely the scientific problem in the first
place. Originally, the hard problem can be stated like this: ‘Why do we
have conscious (or subjective) experience when it’s logically possible not
to have it at all?’ ‘Why aren’t we zombies?’.
As predicated on the discussion above, we can formulate the hard
problem in the following way (with no loss of the original meaning): ‘Why
are we living in the world of quality (the life-world), when it’s logically
possible that we could have lived in the world of pure quantity with no
quality inside whatsoever (i.e., the zombie-world)?’.
In this formulation, the hard problem could also appear from the substi-
tution of the life-world (common sense) with the world of science. Or in the
other words, the world of quality was substituted with the world of quanti-
ty. According to Husserl and Dewey, science grows out of the life-world. It
clarifies and deepens it. But when we have a dominion of the quantitative
world over the qualitative, then it becomes logically possible to ask such a
question: ‘Why do we have quality in the first-place, when it’s conceivable
to have and live in the world of pure quantity (the zombie-world)?’.
Thus, the hard problem (as well as the crisis itself) seems to come out
of the putting the horse in front of the cart: instead of acknowledging that
science originates from the life-world (common sense) and grounding it
there, one assumes the life-world itself is a byproduct of science itself, and
therefore, comes out after, rather than before. In Dewey’s words, the world
of quality (as it is had) is substituted with the world of quantity (as it is
known).
Therefore, the origins of the hard problem are the following: substi-
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tution of the LW / CS (thing-as had / the world-of-quality) with that of
a pure science (things-as-known / the world-of-quantity) as stipulated by
the progress of science and as based on our forgetfulness. If to show that
quality objectively comes first, then the hard problem (as well as the crisis
in question) ceases to exist.
4. Pattern of inquiry / denotative method
What is this ‘common structure or pattern’ of inquiry that could be
applied in ‘both common sense and science’? In his Logic, Dewey calls
this the pattern of inquiry, and in Experience and Nature it is used by the
name of denotative method. That being said, in this paper, I will use them
interchangeably and show why it should be done so.
Before exploring Dewey’s method properly, one has to mention the
following. Dewey is always portrayed as an anti-rationalist and anti-
intellectualist. This is true, but only to some extent. At first, one has to
clarify what Dewey usually meant under ‘rationalism’ in general. I’m eager
to claim that by rationalism, Dewey understand the facts-ideas relation,
when namely ideas come first, despite and often as opposed to the facts.
Rationalism (in a negative sense) is when facts are dependent upon
ideas. When ideas determine facts. This usually leads to idealism, and thus
this kind of rationalism could be called as idealistic rationalism. Schemati-
cally, it could be portrayed in this way:
idea → fact → idea.
That being said, it will be also wrong to view Dewey as anti-rational.
In the very beginning of his Logic, Dewey is talking about rationali-
ty or reasonableness (as different from rationalism), and, by that, he
understands the means-consequences relation. Where by ‘means’ one
should understand the methods, when ‘consequences’ are the outcome of
the application of the methods, — namely knowledge or better to say,
‘warranted assertability’. For Dewey, «the general character of knowledge
as an abstract term is determined by the nature of the methods used, not
vice versa» [8, p. 19].
As opposed to rationalism, the main idea of instrumentalist rationality
is that ideas should be controlled by facts, and not vice versa. Ideas are
always subject to change, because facts are also subject to change in the
first place, and not vice versa.
fact1 → idea1 → fact2 → idea2 . . .∞
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Logic is to be dependent on the sciences and not vice versa:
As the methods of the sciences improve, corresponding changes take place
in logic [. . . ]. [Again, logic is] naturalistic in the sense of the observability,
in the ordinary sense of the word, of activities of inquiry. Conceptions
derived from the mystical faculty of intuition or anything that is so occult
as no not to be open to public inspection and verification (such as the
purely psychical for example) are excluded [8, p. 21, 26].
Problematic situation → means → consequences (situation-as-stabilized)
↓ ↓
Method Warranted Assertion
(Pattern of Inquiry) (knowledge)
The reason, why Dewey preferred ‘warranted assertion’ to the knowled-
ge is what Karl Popper would earlier call the falsification principle [19]:
In scientific inquiry, the criterion of what is taken to be settled, or to be
knowledge, is being so settled that it is available as a resource in further
inquiry; not being settled in such a way as not to be subject to revision
in further inquiry [8, p. 16].
The inquiry starts with the problematic situation. The end of the inqui-
ry should result with the situation as stabilized, with the warranted asserti-
on (or knowledge) as the outcome. The method used is to be the means
for the situation to be stabilized. Inquiry is successful when the end-as-
intended are fulfilled by the means used10.
Speaking phenomenologically, one can say that something is true, if
the meaning-intention functions as a meaning-fulfillment, or if the ‘means’
functionally corresponds to ‘ends’. In other words, P is true, if there’s a
functional correspondence between intention (P-as-intended) and its fulfil-
lment (P-as-fulfilled (realized)). Therefore, this or that hypothesis / idea
/theory is true when what it says, it actually does.
What is the scientific means, which Dewey finds so progressive and
reliable?
The essential structure of the pattern of inquiry. It should be
noted that inquiry is ‘double-barreled’11, because genuinely it has two
constituents:
10«It is reasonable to search for and select the means that will, with the maximum
probability, yield the consequences which are intended» [8, p. 17].
11«Inquiry demands, as we have seen, operations of both observation and ideation.
There would be no control of the proves of inquiry if each of these operations were not
expressly formed with reference to the other» [8, p. 136].
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(1) fact, primary experience (things-as-had), observation, perception;
asymbolic matter;
(2) idea, meaning, hypothesis, theory, secondary experience (things-as-
known); ideation; symbolic form.
The first cluster Dewey calls induction, whereas the second one is
termed by deduction. Dewey suggests that there is always a ‘double
movement’ to and from:
The movement toward suggestion or hypothesis and the movement back to
facts [. . . ] the movement toward building up the idea is known as inductive
discovery (induction, for short); the movement toward developing, apply-
ing, and testing, as deductive proof (deduction, for short) [5, p. 64-65].
Facts should be in a functional correspondence with ideas. Dewey’s











Therefore, to transform an indeterminate situation into a determinate
one, one has to use the above-mentioned pattern or method. That is, there
should be a functional correspondence between facts and ideas, which is
signified by the following operators 

. When the situation (the contextual
whole) is changed, the facts are also to be changed, which leads to the
changes of ideas, which are to be predicated on facts. The latter is signified
by this operator: y. Since, situation is always subject to change (due to
evolution as the fundamental principle of the Universe) [3], this process
will go on forever, which is signified by this symbol ∞.
Dewey’s denotative method as it is portrayed in his Experience and
Nature, has no difference from the pattern mentioned-above, but we can
say some more about it to clarify the things better.
Every ‘experience’ appears as a ‘cluster’ of the primary and secondary
experiences. The former signifies things-as-had (or experienced-as) [4], the
latter points to the things-as-known. So, we always start with primary
experience, form on its basis the secondary experience and then go back to
the primary experience in order to test the secondary one. Again, this is the
same ‘to and from’ movement as specified above.12 Schematically, it can
12«That the subject-matter of primary experience sets the problems and furnishes
the first data of the reflection which constructs the secondary objects is evident; it is
also obvious that test and verification of the latter is secured only by return to things
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be put like this (where experience1 → experience2 → experience3 should
be understood as predicated on situation1 → situation2 → situation3 an
so on):
experience1 → experience2 → experience3 → ∞










Thus, ‘experience’ means a ‘cluster’ of primary (facts) and secondary
(ideas) experiences, which gives rise to another one, and the latter to
another one, and this process goes on forever, due to a continuity between
them as well as interaction13 between each other, as well as with their
environments. Continuity also prevents this or that cluster to become fixed
and institutionalized. Whereas, the principle of interaction invites current
experience to influence the future ones, as well as for the latter to borrow
something from the former.
To sum up, one can definitely say that not only the pattern of sci-
entific inquiry and the denotative method refer to essentially the same
method, but even more – one can suggest that experience and inquiry are
basically the same as well. Inquiry is experiential : we start with a quali-
tative situation (which grounds the objects of primary experience), with
the things-as-had and test our hypotheses (secondary experience) through
going back to where we started. On the other hand, experience as such
is an inquiry, because we always deal with problematic situations (when
’something happens’) [7, p. 13]. Namely the latter points to the fact that
our experiences are precarious and that, to survive and function well, we
are trying to transform the indeterminate situation into determinate one,
which signify our experience as stable. Due to our always changing envi-
ronment and situations, we essentially oscillate between the precariousness
and stableness of our experience. Thus, we always inquire into the past,
future and present. I think, Dewey would definitely agree with Karl Popper
in that ‘all life is problem-solving’. Experience is inquiry; inquiry is life.
of crude or macroscopic experience the sun, earth, plants and animals of common,
every-day life. But just what role do the objects attained in reflection play? Where do
they come in? They explain the primary objects, they enable us to grasp them with
understanding, instead of just having sense-contact with them» [7, p. 16].
13This principle «assigns equal rights to both factors in experience – objective and
internal conditions. Taken together, or in their interaction, they form what we call a
situation» [15, p. 518].
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We live through inquiry, because life is inquiry. Thus, we are doomed to
learning, development and growing as people. Life with no inquiry is not
life at all. It is simply death.
Remark on experience as aesthetic14. It will not be a mistake
to say that Dewey is a philosopher of science in a very wide sense, and
namely scientific method (the pattern of inquiry) is what Dewey applied
in all areas of philosophy he was dealing with. And aesthetics is not an
exception here. It was another area in which he employed his method.
When is experience consummatory? Let’s recall the way I interpreted
’experience’, i.e., as a cluster of primary and secondary experiences, which
gives rise to another cluster and so on (due to the principles of continuity
and interaction). Now, let’s look at that cluster closer. Thus, it consists
of the primary and secondary stuff, and it is necessary that it should be
a functional correspondence between them. That being said, when does
aesthetic feeling arise? I think, it is a byproduct if the above-mentioned
functional correspondence does happen! Then it could be a feeling of de-
light when it does, when it works!
In his Logic, Dewey seems to support such a conclusion:
The words beauty, elegance, show clearly that here is a case of appreciati-
on. Even slight analysis of the passage shows that the theory is elegant and
has beauty because its subject-matter presents a consummated harmoni-
ous ordering of diverse facts and conceptions. Intellectual activity, science,
has its phases of appreciation as truly as have the fine arts. They arise
whenever inquiry has reached a close that fulfils the activities and condi-
tions which led up to it. Without these phases, sometimes intense, no
inquirer would have the experiential sign that his inquiry had reached its
close.15 [. . . ] The occurrence of these judgments of completion, not di-
fferent in kind from those ordinarily called aesthetic, constitutes a series
of landmarks in the progress of any undertaking. They are signs of the
achieved coherence of factual material and the consistency of conceptual
material [8, p. 178].16
14This reflection is based on the reading from [15, p. 525-574] on Dewey’s Aesthetics
(chapters 33, 34, 35).
15«Words such as climax, peak, culmination, refer to consummatory objects» [8,
p. 177].
16In his Experience and Nature, Dewey seems to express the same conclusion: «The
idea that meanings are originally floating and aesthetic and become intellectual, or
practical and cognitive, by a conjunction of happy accidents, puts the cart before the
horse. Its element of truth is that there is a genuine distinction between having a
meaning and using it; the element of falsity is in supposing that meanings, ideas, are
first had and afterwards used. It required long experience to enforce recognition of the
distinction; for originally any meaning had, is had in and for use. To hold an idea
contemplatively and aesthetically is a late achievement in civilization» [7, p. 220].
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5. Dewey, Popper and the method of natural sciences:
what comes first, hypothesis or fact?
One can say that Dewey insists on the ‘objective’ state of affairs:
that namely objective facts (objective situation) lead us to come up with
hypotheses do cope with the former; that these hypotheses are not ideali-
stic (i.e., with no facts as backing them up). In other words, if there are no
facts, there is no need for hypotheses as such. Namely that’s why Dewey
insists on the induction (when facts via observation bear hypotheses) as
the first step of the scientific method, which is followed by deduction
(as experimental testing of the hypotheses on facts). Induction: [facts →
hypotheses]; deduction: [hypotheses → facts]. It’s obvious that together
they constitute denotative method or pattern of inquiry (which is a functi-
onal correspondence of them) [8, p. 423, 428]. On the other hand, Dewey
does agree that to deal with facts as facts (via experimental observati-
on)17, one does need ideas / conceptions / hypotheses beforehand too18.
We do need ideas to specify facts from the contextual whole (situation)19.
That’s why he treats his method as hypothetical-deductive as well. One
could suggest that what stops him from accepting this naming entirely is
his worry that if we start to emphasize hypotheses at first, we could end
up with idealistic doctrines (ideas – facts – ideas), with no facts as the
foundation20.
Karl Popper, on the other hand, is the one who proposed the hypotheti -
cal-deductive method, or a deductive-method of testing [18]. To some extent,
Popper looks more at the ‘subjective’ or ‘epistemological’ side of the same
method [17, p. 136], while insisting that we already start with hypotheses.
In this sense, Popper starts where Dewey would put just a footnote: that
is to cope with facts as facts, we need ideas (as hypotheses) at first.
‘Subjectively’, we do need ‘secondary experience’ to specify and identify
17«Observations formed by variation of conditions on the basis of some idea or
theory constitute experiment» [5, p. 298].
18Induction as such means the preparation of the material of perception for the
further testing, but the very process of this preparation should be already governed by
conceptions / hypotheses / ideas: «the operations that prepare the material must be
so directed by ideas (as hypotheses), as to satisfy, conjunctively and disjunctively, the
functions of affirmation-negation» [8, p. 427]. «The operations of experimental observati-
on which prepares standardized materials need direction by conceptions» [8, p. 428].
19«The development in discourse of the directive conception that is involved provides
the sole variable material for identifying the deductive phase of scientific method» [8,
p. 428].
20In general, for Dewey, hypothetical deductive-method is rather an ‘intermediate
stage of inquiry’ [8, p. 423-424].
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the ‘primary experience’ from the contextual whole (situation). Otherwise,
it would be impossible to look at this or that event as ‘fact’ — it would be
just a pure ‘had’21.
In this sense, we can say that Dewey’s and Popper’s understanding of
the scientific method is genuinely the same; the only difference being one of
emphasis. Thus, both would agree that facts exist indeed objectively prior
to our making hypotheses to test them, but before we do the latter, these
are just potentially facts: they need to be specified from the contextual
whole of the situation.
An idea of an end to be reached, an end-in-view, is logically indispensable
in discrimination of existential material as the evidential and testing facts
of the case. Without it, there is no guide for observation; without it, one
can have no conception of what one should look for or even is looking for.
One ‘fact’ would be just as good as another-that is, good for nothing in
control of inquiry and formation and in settlement of a problem [8, p. 491].
Therefore, events are to be looked as facts, when the initial hypotheses
are applied to them. Only then they became real facts.
A generalization in the form of a hypothesis is a prerequisite condition
of selection and ordering of material as facts. A generalization is quite
as much an antecedent of observation and assemblage of facts as it is a
consequence of observing and assembling them. Or, more correctly stated,
no generalization can emerge as a warranted conclusion unless a generali-
zation in the form of a hypothesis has previously exercised control of the
operations of discriminative selection and (synthetic) ordering of material
to form the facts of and for a problem [8, p. 491-492].
Scientific method begins when we start experimentally applying the
secondary experience (hypotheses) to the primary one (existential mat-
ters)22. Other than that, we are still at the common sense (prescientific)
level of existence23.
21«[. . . ] without a problem, no observation» [18, p. 6].
22«To return to the point suggested earlier: what scientific inquirers do, as distinct
from what they say, is to execute certain operations of experimentation — which are
operations of doing and making that modify antecedently given existential conditions
so that the results of the transformation are facts which are relevant and weighty in
solution of a given problem. Operations of experimentation are cases of blind trial and
error which at best only succeed in suggesting a hypothesis to be later tried except as
they are themselves directed by a hypothesis about a solution» [8, p. 492]
23«Nothing so fatal to science can be imagined as elimination of experimentation,
and experimentation is a form of doing and making. Application of conceptions and
hypotheses to existential matters through the medium of doing and making is an intri-
nsic constituent of scientific method» [8, p. 434-435].
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That being said, if to ‘reconcile’ the differences between the emphases,
one could say that their methods are initially the same. The following
scheme could clarify what was said before.
(1) Problematic situation → (3) facts (primary experience)
(problematic contextual whole; (application of initial hypothesis)
potential facts and primary experience)
↑ ↓
(2) Initial hypothesis → (4) conclusive hypothesis
(secondary experience) (secondary experience)
The problematic situation comes first. In order to distinguish facts
from it, we need initial hypotheses. After testing it, we come up with
the conclusive hypothesis and identify facts as facts. Namely, with the
application of the secondary experience, we identify primary experience as
primary (i.e., what led us to the secondary experience). But if there was
no secondary experience before, there would be no possibility to identify
the primary experience as such. If to look at the scheme above-mentioned,
Dewey starts emphasizing scientific method as scientific with steps (1), (3)
and (4) (while also acknowledging that (2)) also takes place, but usually
omitting it); when Popper thinks that genuine science starts with the
application of (2) to (1) (also stating that (1) precedes (2)).
Thus, both agree with (1) as the objective start, but the place where
they disagree is the emphasis in the same process.
The method, which could suite to both Dewey and Popper24 (if to
eliminate the differences in the emphases) would be the following:
y y y
Problematic
situation → Hypothesis1 Hypothesis2 Hypothesis3
    
∞
Fact1 Fact2 Fact3
Since, Popper was starting with deduction, and Dewey, in his turn,
did acknowledge that hypotheses come before facts (which is deduction in
Popper’s sense), both Dewey’s and Popper’s scientific methods could be
24Popper’s article The Logic and Evolution of Scientific Discovery could serve as a
good example of a problem situation as a start of inquiry [18, p. 3-22].
20 Instrumentalist logic of scientific discovery
called hypothetic-deductive method25. Paradoxically, what Dewey called
‘induction’ was basically deduction in Popper’s sense.
Prima facie, it seems there’s more divergence in Dewey’s and Popper’s
views on scientific method. But after further clarification, the situation
changes and convergence becomes more visible on the horizon.
Remark on Dewey’s and Popper’s methods and philosophy
of mind. Does Dewey’s emphasis on induction (facts → hypotheses),
rather than deduction (hypotheses → facts), stem from his behavioristic
emergentism (that instead of mind / consciousness / self, what arises is
the life-behavior)?
Dewey always emphasizes something as ’taken’, ’acted upon’, and
not just ’given’26. Indeed, he’s very critical of any kind of purely first-
person attitude toward knowledge. Even his notion of ’primary experience’
(something as ’had’), which prima facie resembles the phenomenologi-
cal ’givenness’ is an appeal to the ’had’ again as publicly observable
and has nothing to do with the first-person experience, on which the
phenomenological tradition is built. To put it shortly, Dewey’s perspective
when looking at experience is third-person, and is sharply opposed to the
first-person one.
As it was mentioned before, the activity of an organism comes from the
functional correspondence between fact (perception) and idea (concept)
with no tertium quid as an ego or self. But here arises the question: if the
organism’s self is eliminated, where does this organism’s motivation come
from? Why does a human organism have to act upon namely this fact
and this stimulus as opposed to the other? It seems that Dewey’s third-
person perspective and functionalism leaves this question open. Since, self
is eliminated, Dewey’s emphasis on facts (as objective states of affairs),
rather than hypotheses, which come from the ‘subjective’ aspect of an
organism, can suggest why Dewey’s appeal to induction is so emphasi-
25In his letter to Max Otto from 25 January 1929, Dewey writes very clearly as
regarding his denotative method as expressed in Chapter 1 of his Experience and Nature:
«What I meant — only didn’t know it — was that reflective analysis & its products
form a method for leading back to the subjectmatter of direct or ‘gross’ experience; so
that the former designates or denotes a path & projects a goal to be found in the latter
— which being illuminated, clarified & directed by reflective findings as method, also
tests and checks the latter» [7, p. 408].
26«That which is ‘given’ in the strict sense of the word ‘given’, is the total field of
situation. [. . . ] In the strict sense, it is taken rather than given» [8, p. 127]. «Objects and
qualities as they naturally present themselves or as they are ‘given’, are not only not
the data of science but constitute the most direct and important obstacle to formation
of those ideas and hypotheses that are generally relevant and effective» [8, p. 421].
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zed: elimination of subjectivity, and the constant emphasis on objectivity
(as something publicly observable, — be it problematic situation, facts,
primary experience etc.), due to his orientation on the natural scienti-
fic method and caution against idealism and any kind of supernaturalism
could lead Dewey to looking at this objectivity as primary scientific matter,
while making hypotheses the secondary one.
Popper’s philosophy of mind was that of interactionism. For Popper,
self indeed existed, and it was not reducible to the brain or behavior either.
In Popper’s words, World 2 (mind / consciousness / self) was not to be
reducible and identified with World 1 (brain, behavior or any physical
state).
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